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Abstract
I investigate RDefforts for process innovation in a monopoly with uncertain demand. Two
different models are proposed, where either (i) the reservation price is affected by an additive
shock and the marginal production cost is increasing, or (ii) a multiplicative shock on the
slope of demand combines with a flat marginal production cost. In either case, price-setting
behaviour generates a larger RDinvestment than quantity-setting behaviour. An Arrovian
interpretation of the first result and a Schumpeterian interpretation of the second are
proposed.
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Abstract
I investigate R&D eﬀorts for process innovation in a monopoly
with uncertain demand. Two diﬀerent models are proposed, where
either (i) the reservation price is aﬀected by an additive shock and the
marginal production cost is increasing, or (ii) a multiplicative shock
on the slope of demand combines with a ﬂat marginal production cost.
In either case, price-setting behaviour generates a larger R&D invest-
ment than quantity-setting behaviour. An Arrovian interpretation of
the ﬁrst result and a Schumpeterian interpretation of the second are
proposed.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The incentives to invest in R&D (either for process or for product innovation)
have been extensively investigated in the existing literature. The available
contributions focus upon either (i) the role of uncertainty in the R&D activity,
given the prize to be awarded to the winner of the race, or (ii) the role of
the type of market competition, either Cournot or Bertrand, and market
structure in shaping ﬁrms’ incentives (for exhaustive accounts of both strands
see, e.g., Reinganum, 1989; and Martin, 2001, ch. 14).
To the best of my knowledge, the interplay between demand uncertainty
and ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts has not been investigated thus far, although there
exist several inﬂuential contributions dealing with demand uncertainty either
in monopoly (see Leland, 1972; Klemperer and Meyer, 1986) or in oligopoly
(Weitzman, 1974; Klemperer and Meyer, 1986) or in perfect competition
(Sandmo, 1971). All of these contributions focus upon the optimal price or
quantity choice and the relative proﬁtability of such strategies. In particular,
Klemperer and Meyer (1986) show that if technology is characterised by an
increasing marginal production cost, then the monopolist is better oﬀ using
the output level rather than the price.
Here, I rely on Klemperer and Meyer’s analysis to model the relationship
between the monopolist’s incentive to invest in process innovation and de-
mand uncertainty. In particular, I propose two alternative models. In the
ﬁrst, an additive shock appears in the demand function and the cost func-
tion is convex. Under these conditions, expected proﬁts (gross of R&D costs)
are larger under quantity-setting behaviour. In the second, a multiplicative
shock aﬀects the slope of the demand function, while production costs are
linear in the output level. Under these conditions, instead, expected proﬁts
(gross of R&D costs) are larger under price-setting behaviour. In both cases,
the monopolist invests in R&D in order to reduce marginal cost. I show that,
irrespective of the assumptions adopted regarding the type of uncertainty and
the shape of the cost function, the optimal R&D investment is larger when
the monopolist sets the price than when it sets the output level. In the ﬁrst
model, this is due to the fact that increasing the R&D eﬀort amounts in fact
to a decrease in the uncertainty aﬀecting the proﬁts generated by ﬁxing the
price; it is indeed an optimal response to the expected proﬁt loss associated
with the variance of the shock, that the monopolist foresees when setting
the price. In the second model, R&D cannot contribute to reduce the eﬀects
of uncertainty on the expected proﬁts associated with quantity-setting be-
2haviour; therefore, the larger funds available under price-setting behaviour
drive the result.
The two alternative models are laid out and investigated in section 2.
Concluding comments are in section 3.
2 The setup
Consider a single-product monopolist that invests in R&D for process inno-
vation and supplies the good to the market by setting either the price or the
output level so as to maximise proﬁts.1 Setting up the plant involves a ﬁxed
cost k, whose size is such to allow the monopolist to survive while preventing
further entries. Deﬁne as πm the instantaneous monopoly proﬁts, gross of
R&D and setup costs. R&D activities involve costs Γ(x),xbeing the R&D
eﬀort. The R&D cost function is characterised by the following properties:
Γ0 (x) > 0a n dΓ00 (x) ≤ 0.
The expected net proﬁts are:
EΠ
m = Eπ
m − k − Γ(x). (1)
As to the issue of modelling production costs and the demand function, I will
consider two alternative cases based upon Klemperer and Meyer (1986):
• Model I: The market demand function is p = a−Q+ε. The additive
shock ε has E (ε)=0a n dE (ε2)=σ2. The cost function is C (Q)=
cQ2/2, with c = c(x)a n dc0 (x) < 0; c00 (x) ≥ 0.2
• Model II: The market demand function is p = a−Q/θ. The shock on




= s2 > 1. Accord-
ingly, I may deﬁne z ≡ E (1/θ), which is larger than one (by Jensen’s
inequality). The cost function is C (Q)=γQ, with γ = γ (x)a n d
γ0 (x) < 0; γ00 (x) ≥ 0.
Concerning the setup cost, in order to prevent entry it must be that
k ∈
¡
Eπd − Γ(x),Eπm − Γ(x)
¢
, where Eπd is the gross expected proﬁto f
1The approach I adopt here is static, but it can be easily shown that it encompasses
t h ec a s eo fa ni n ﬁnite horizon with constant discounting.
2As is known from Klemperer and Meyer (1986, Lemma 1), if the marginal production
cost were constant, then the additive shock on demand would exert no eﬀects on the
equilibrium behaviour of the ﬁrm.
3a ﬁrm in duopoly. With additive shocks and increasing marginal costs Eπd
is the outcome of a quantity-setting game, while with multiplicative shocks
and constant marginal costs it is associated with a price-setting game (cf.
Klemperer and Meyer, 1986, Propositions 1-2).
In both models, the monopolist may use either price or quantity as the
market variable to maximise per-period proﬁts.
2.1 Equilibrium analysis: Model I
Under the additive shock on the vertical intercept of the demand function














under quantity- and price-setting behaviour, respectively (cf. Klemperer and
Meyer, 1986, pp. 636-37). Therefore, the larger the variance, the larger the
diﬀerence Eπm
Q − Eπm
P , all else equal. Proﬁts (2) can be plugged into (1)
in order to derive the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) pertaining to the R&D



























































where Ψ ≡ (ac0 (x))
2 /[2 + c(x)]
3 . Clearly, c00
Q (x) >c 00
P (x) for all positive σ.
Accordingly, if the problem is concave under quantity-setting, then it is also
under price-setting. Therefore, in the remainder of this subsection I will pose
c00 (x) ≥ c00
Q(x).
4Now deﬁne as xQ the R&D eﬀo r tt h a ts a t i s ﬁes (3), i.e., consider the proﬁt-











0 (x) > 0( 7 )
given that c0 (x) < 0. That is, in correspondence of the R&D eﬀo r tt h a ts a t -
isﬁes ∂EΠm
Q/∂x =0 , the corresponding FOC under price-setting behaviour,
∂EΠm
P /∂x, is still positive, i.e., the expected marginal proﬁtf r o mR & Du n -
der price-setting behaviour is itself still positive. Accordingly, when the ﬁrm
sets the price it has a higher incentive to invest in R&D as compared to the
quantity-setting case.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis: Model II
Now examine the setup where the shock aﬀects the slope of the demand










P = z · Eπ
m
Q =





Q <E π m
P since z>1. Proceeding as in the previous subsection,





[a − γ (x)]γ0 (x)
2z
− Γ





[a − γ (x)]γ0 (x)
2
− Γ
0 (x)=0 . (10)
















2 − 2Γ00 (x)





Q (x) ≥ γ00
P (x)f o ra l lΓ00 (x) ≤ 0a n da l lz>1. Once again, if the
problem is concave under quantity-setting, then it is also under price-setting.
5Consequently, to ensure concavity, in the remainder of this subsection I will
suppose γ00(x) ≥ γ00
Q(x).
Then, one can proceed by solving (9) and plugging the expression Γ0 (x)=





(z − 1)[a − γ (x)]γ0 (x)
2z
> 0( 1 3 )
given that γ0 (x) < 0. That is, when ∂EΠm
Q/∂x =0 ,∂ E Πm
P /∂x > 0w h i c h
entails that the level of x that maximises the net expected proﬁts is higher
under price-setting than under quantity-setting behaviour.
The discussion of the two models can be summarised in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 1 Provided concavity conditions are satisﬁed, then irrespective
of whether (i) the marginal cost is increasing and demand is aﬀe c t e db ya n
additive shock, or (ii) the marginal cost is ﬂat and uncertainty aﬀects the
slope of demand, the R&D investment is larger when the monopolist sets the
price than when it sets the output level.
However, the source of the result is diﬀerent in the two cases. With
increasing marginal cost and an additive shock on the vertical intercept of
demand, gross proﬁts are larger under quantity-setting behaviour, so that the
ﬁrm invests more under price-setting in order to reduce the negative bearings
of the reservation price variance on proﬁts. In the limit, as the marginal cost
tends to zero, the eﬀect of the shock disappears altogether. That is, by
increasing the intensity of the R&D eﬀort, the monopolist gets two eggs in
one basket: a more eﬃcient technology as well as a reduction in the negative
eﬀects of uncertainty on proﬁts. This is an insurance policy against the
uncertainty aﬀecting the demand function. On the contrary, in the presence
of a constant marginal cost coupled with a multiplicative shock on the slope of
the demand function, setting the price allows for higher expected gross proﬁts
than setting the output level. Given that in this case a larger investment does
not bring about a reduction in the degree of uncertainty while it entails an
increase in gross proﬁts for any given z, the incentive to invest in R&D is
driven by a ‘deep purse’ argument.
These results can be interpreted in the following way. In the existing
literature on R&D, a wide attention has been devoted to the relationship
between market power (or the structure of the industry) and the associated
6incentives to invest in innovative activities. This assessment is to be traced
back to the debate between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) and the
balance between the strategic eﬀect and the replacement eﬀect. The for-
mer uses a deep purse argument in favour of monopoly, while the latter
speaks in favour of (more) competitive industries. In the present model only
monopoly is considered; hence, strictly speaking, one could not refer to the
Schumpeter-Arrow debate here. However, the presence of demand uncer-
tainty gives rise to a setting where price and quantity behaviour on the part
of the monopolist entails diﬀerent R&D incentives for a given industry struc-
ture, because expected gross proﬁts diﬀer across cases. That is, a plausible
way of rephrasing the respective positions of Schumpeter and Arrow consists
in asking how higher or lower expected proﬁts may shape the intensity of in-
novative activities, taking as given the fact that the industry is a monopoly.3
The case of increasing marginal costs coupled with additive demand shocks
has a deﬁnite Arrowian ﬂavour, as lower proﬁts generated by price-setting
call for more intense R&D eﬀorts. In the case of constant marginal costs
and multiplicative demand shocks, instead, the interpretation of the result
is Schumpeterian, with higher R&D eﬀorts being observed when expected
gross proﬁts are larger, which happens under quantity-setting.
3 Concluding remarks
I have modelled R&D eﬀorts for process innovation in a monopoly with un-
certain demand. Two diﬀerent models have been considered: one where an
additive shock on the reservation price couples with an increasing marginal
production cost, and the other with a multiplicative shock on the slope of
demand and a constant marginal production cost. In either case, price-
setting behaviour generates a larger R&D investment than quantity-setting
behaviour. The reason for this result is that process R&D provides the ﬁrm
with an insurance policy against uncertainty in the ﬁrst model, while it can-
not do so in the second model.
Extending the above analysis to oligopoly models may represent a pro-
ductive perspective, which is left to future research.
3This perspective has been already used in the literature (although in models that
diﬀer from the one I consider), to compare the incentives of a given number of oligopolists
when switching from price- to quantity-setting behaviour (see, e.g., Delbono and Denicol` o,
1990).
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